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CONFIDENTIALLY SPEAKING: PROTECTING THE PRESS
FROM LIABILITY FOR BROKEN CONFIDENTIALITY
PROMISES-Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
Abstract: In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Supreme Court held that the First Amend-
ment does not bar suits against newspapers for breaches of confidentiality promises. By
following its cases holding that the press is subject to neutral laws, the Court ignored its
precedent mandating that state laws inhibiting publication violate the First Amendment
absent a compelling state interest. This Note explores both lines of cases and concludes
that application of a state law that inhibits publication is unconstitutional if its utility in
effecting a legitimate state interest is outweighed by the public's interest in receiving the
information. Therefore, courts should read Cohen narrowly, and legislatures should act to
shield the press from liability for breach of confidentiality.
Should the press be constitutionally insulated from liability for
printing the name of a source despite a promise of anonymity? Until
recently, newspaper editors and publishers considered confidentiality
promises an ethical obligation. The Supreme Court, however, has
added a legal dimension to a newspaper's confidentiality obligation by
holding in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 1 that the First Amendment does
not bar actions against a newspaper for breach of a promise of
confidentiality.
This Note sets forth the procedural and factual history of Cohen,
including the rationale of the courts at each level. It also examines
two lines of Supreme Court cases that could have controlled the deci-
sion in Cohen, as well as pressures within the media to reveal sources
despite promises of confidentiality. This Note concludes that legisla-
tive intervention and a narrow reading of Cohen are appropriate to
minimize the speech-limiting impact of the Court's ruling because
revealing the identity of a confidential source may serve an important
political function.
I. COHEN v. CO WLES MEDIA CO.: WHEN A WORD
IS A BOND
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. arose in the context of a political elec-
tion. Dan Cohen was the public relations director for the Independ-
ent-Republican (IR) gubernatorial candidate Wheelock Whitney.2
One week before the election, IR supporters unearthed documents
proving that the Democratic-Farmer-Laborer candidate for lieutenant
governor, Marlene Johnson, had been arrested in 1969 for unlawful
1. Ill S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
2. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 252 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
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assembly and again in 1970 for petty theft.3 A number of IR support-
ers, including Cohen, met to discuss dissemination of the information.
The group decided that Cohen should anonymously release the infor-
mation because he had the best rapport with the local media.4 Cohen
leaked the information to reporters from the Minneapolis Star and
Tribune and the St. Paul Pioneer Press Dispatch in exchange for ver-
bal promises of confidentiality.5
Each newspaper subsequently breached its promise of confidential-
ity. Journalists from both newspapers, after confronting Johnson with
the information against her, learned that the unlawful assembly charge
was for participation in a labor protest and had later been dropped.6
The journalists also learned that Johnson's conviction for petty theft
had been vacated less than a year after its imposition.7 Each newspa-
per independently decided to print the story and Johnson's explana-
tions. More importantly, against the wishes of the journalists who
promised Cohen anonymity, the newspapers identified Cohen as the
informant.8 As a result, Cohen was fired from his job at an advertising
agency. 9
A. The Minnesota Trial and Appellate Courts
Legal action followed the disclosure of Cohen's name. Cohen suc-
cessfully sued the newspapers for breach of contract and for fraudu-
lent misrepresentation and received both punitive and compensatory
damages.10 A divided Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the
breach of contract claim but reversed the fraudulent misrepresentation
claim and the punitive damages award.11 The court found that the
First Amendment does not shield the press from its contractual obli-




5. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 200 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513
(1991).
6. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2516 (1991).
7. Cohen, 457 N.W.2d at 200-01.
8. Id. at 201.
9. Id. at 202.
10. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 445 N.W.2d 248, 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
11. Id. at 262.
12. Id. at 257. The court stated, "Reporting that the source was aligned with the IR party in
some manner would have satisfied the need to describe the source." Id.
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B. The Minnesota Supreme Court
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's rever-
sal of the fraudulent misrepresentation judgment but reversed on the
contract claim. t3 The court found that promises of confidentiality are
ethical, not contractual, obligations.14 The court also found that
promissory estoppel15 was inapplicable because the requirement that
"injustice can only be avoided by enforcing the promise" was not
met.16 Although the equities of the case favored neither party, the
inhibitory effect on the First Amendment of enforcing the press'
promises persuaded the court to leave the parties "to their trust in
each other."1 7 Cohen appealed the dismissal of the promissory estop-
pel claim to the United States Supreme Court.
C. The United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Minnesota Supreme
Court's decision and remanded the case for decision on the estoppel
claim without the First Amendment as a counterweight.1 8 The major-
ity initially determined that Minnesota estoppel law as applied to
newspapers involved state action implicating the First Amendment. 9
The Court then found inapplicable a line of cases invalidating various
state statutes that impeded publication of truthful, lawfully-obtained
13. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513 (1991).
14. Id. at 203.
15. The Minnesota Supreme Court was the first to apply promissory estoppel to Cohen's
broken confidentiality promise as a manner more flexible than rigid contract analysis to weigh
the enforceability of a promise. Id. The court believed that the newspapers' promises of
confidentiality could have implicitly created a contract "in law where none exists in fact" if the
promises reasonably induced definite action by the promisee and if "injustice [could] only be
avoided by enforcing the promise[s]." Id. at 203-04.
16. Id. at 204. Both parties, the court intimated, tried to manipulate the agreement to their
own benefit. Cohen may have used the agreement to insulate himself from responsibility for
dissemination of misinformation damaging to his political opponents. The newspapers may have
induced Cohen into providing information by promising him anonymity although they never
intended to protect Cohen's identity.
17. Id. at 205.
18. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2519-20 (1991).
19. Id. at 2517. The newspapers argued that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the case because state law alone determines when an agreement becomes a binding contract. The
newspapers also argued that the First Amendment dicta by the Minnesota Supreme Court was
mere surplusage, and thus, no First Amendment question was properly before the Court.
Respondent Cowles Media Cos. Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 6-7, Cohen (1991 U.S. Briefs
LEXIS No. 90-634); Respondent Cowles Media Cos. Brief at 9-12, Cohen (1991 U.S. Briefs
LEXIS No. 90-634). The Court, however, stated, "Our cases teach that the application of state
rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes
'state action' under the Fourteenth Amendment." Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2517.
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information.2 ° Instead, the Court based its decision on cases holding
that "neutral laws" were applicable to the press.2 The Court found
that Minnesota's doctrine of promissory estoppel was a law of general
applicability and therefore should be equally applicable to the press as
to the general public.22
Several justices dissented, reflecting divergent views about the con-
stitutional standard to be applied when state law inhibits publication.
Justice Blackmun argued that the majority erred in relying upon the
principle that the press is subject to general laws.2' Blackmun further
argued that Minnesota's estoppel law would place a burden on the
First Amendment, impermissibly punishing the expression of truthful
information. 24  Justice Souter argued that neutrally-applied laws
might be as intrusive on First Amendment protections as laws aimed
at speech itself.25 Souter stated that a balancing test weighing compet-
ing state and constitutional interests was necessary to decide cases
such as Cohen.26 Souter concluded that publishing Cohen's name was
vital to foster a better-informed Minnesota citizenry, which in turn is
necessary for prudent self-government. 27 The state interest in protect-
20. Id. at 2518; see, eg., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979); see also infra
notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
21. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518. "Neutral laws" are laws that do not single out the press for
regulation and thus only incidentally affect their right to publish. The majority in Cohen stated
that the enforcement of "general laws against the press is not subject to stricter scrutiny than
would be applied to enforcement against other persons or organizations." Quoting from
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937), the majority concluded that "[i]t is
therefore beyond dispute that '[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from the
application of general laws. He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of
others.'" Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518; see also infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
22. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19.
23. Id. at 2520 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Because the First Amendment protections
involved in this case would be equally available to non-media defendants, Justice Blackmun
argued, "[t]he majority's admonition that '[t]he publisher of a newspaper has no special
immunity from the application of general laws,'. and its reliance on the cases that support that
principle, are therefore misplaced." Id
24. Id. at 2521-22. The majority countered Blackmun's argument by stating that
compensatory damages are not technically punishment and that, in any case, the characterization
of the award makes no difference when a neutral law is being applied, Id. at 2519. In rebuttal,
Justice Blackmun pointed out that the Court has consistently held "that the imposition of civil
liability based on protracted expression constitutes 'punishment' of speech for First Amendment
purposes." Id. at 2522 n.4. Blackmun's position is consistent with the conclusion of this Note.
See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
25. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
26. Id. It is unclear whether Souter would go so far as to wholly abandon the "neutral
application" test as this Note does. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
27. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Souter stated:
The propriety of [Cohen's] leak to respondents could be taken to reflect on his character,
which in turn could be taken to reflect on the character of the candidate who had retained
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ing agreements between parties was therefore outweighed by the
greater constitutional interest in disseminating information important
to political debate.28
II. THE COMING OF COHEN: TWO VIEWS ON THE PRESS'
RIGHT TO PUBLISH IN THE FACE OF
PROHIBITIONS
The Supreme Court identified two separate and apparently conflict-
ing lines of cases that might determine whether the First Amendment
bars informants' suits against newspapers for breaking promises of
confidentiality.29 One line of cases holds that the First Amendment
does not shield the press from neutral laws.3" Another line of cases
suggests that states may not enforce laws that punish the press for
publishing truthful information absent a compelling state interest.31
A. No Exception for the Press: The Branzburg Cases
The Supreme Court has long insisted that the Constitution accords
journalists no special privilege from legal process.32 In Branzburg v.
Hayes, 33 the Court held that the First Amendment does not accord a
journalist immunity from answering grand jury questions about confi-
dential sources, especially in light of the public interest in criminal
prosecution. 34 Notwithstanding a journalist's promise of confidential-
him as an advisor. An election could turn on just such a factor; if it should, I am ready to
assume that it would be to the greater public good, at least over the long run.
Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2518.
30. See supra note 21 and infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
32. The Court has recognized the role of the press as being a vehicle for individual expression,
an educator of the public, and a check on the government. See Michael Dicke, Note, Promises
and the Press: First Amendment Limitations on News Source Recovery for Breach of a
Confidentiality Agreement, 73 MINN. L. REV. 1553, 1558-59 (1989). The press, however, has
been afforded little constitutional protection. The Supreme Court has articulated lofty ideals for
upholding freedom of the press in many cases. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)
("These [First Amendment] freedoms are delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious
in our society."); Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936) ('T]he suppression
or abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press cannot be regarded otherwise than with
grave concern."). But the Court has consistently rejected any argument that the First
Amendment grants favored constitutional status to the press and is "suspicious of any claim of
privilege that appear[s] to elevate journalists above other citizens." LAURENCE TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSrIrUTIONAL LAW § 12-22, at 971 (2d ed. 1988). But see Potter Stewart, Or of
the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975) (arguing that the press holds special constitutional status
because it is protected as an institution).
33. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
34. Id. at 690-91.
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ity, the journalist must inform the grand jury of a source's identity if
the grand jury requires such information in its investigation of a
crime.35
Despite the Branzburg decision, lower courts consistently have read
Branzburg to recognize some privilege of confidentiality.36 Branzburg
holds only that First Amendment freedoms are not abridged when
journalists are required to appear and testify before state or federal
grand juries.3 7 Thus journalists might enjoy a general privilege in civil
cases, legislative or administrative hearings, or other forms of investi-
gation.38 Moreover, five justices in Branzburg expressly recognized
constitutional protection of confidentiality under certain circum-
stances.39  Finally, in the wake of Branzburg, many states enacted
shield laws offering varying protections of confidentiality promises.'
35. Id. at 707-08. The Court noted that "[g]rand juries are subject to judicial control and
subpoenas and motions to quash. We do not expect courts will forget that grand juries must
operate within the limits of the First Amendment as well as the Fifth." Id. at 708. Thus the
majority "trusted that judges supervising grand jury investigations would be sufficiently sensitive
to first amendment concerns to minimize the danger of such abuse." TRIBE, supra note 32, at
971.
36. See, eg., In re Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 680 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1982)
(nonparty witness cannot be compelled to disclose sources when sources' identities bore only
tenuous relationship to antitrust claims), cert. denied sub nom. Arizona v. McGraw-Hill, Inc.,
459 U.S. 909 (1982); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (journalist cannot be
compelled to disclose confidential sources in discovery even though the information was crucial
to litigants' case); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980)
(journalists have a First Amendment, non-absolute privilege against compelled disclosure of
confidential informants' identities), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041 (1981).
37. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
38. Civil, legislative, and administrative action involve a lesser countervailing interest to
journalistic immunity than criminal actions. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1000 (4th ed. 1991); see, eg., Democratic National Committee v.
McCord, 356 F. Supp. 1394 (D.D.C. 1973) (journalists enjoy a qualified privilege of
confidentiality in civil actions).
39. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall,
recognized a qualified privilege of confidentiality for the press. Stewart argued that to overcome
the privilege of immunity, the government must demonstrate probable cause to believe that a
journalist has information relevant to a potential violation of the law. The government must
prove that the information could not be obtained by means less intrusive on First Amendment
rights and that there is a compelling interest in obtaining the information. Branzburg, 408 U.S.
at 725. Justice Douglas' dissent argued that journalists have an absolute right to refuse to appear
before a grand jury unless the reporter is implicated in the crime. Id. at 711. Justice Powell, in
concurrence, emphasized the limited nature of the Court's decision, arguing that the First
Amendment intrusions should be balanced against the community interest in criminal
investigation on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 709. The tentative nature of Justice Powell's
concurrence led Justice Stewart to comment that Branzburg was deciked by a vote of four-and-a-
half to four-and-a-half. Stewart, supra note 32, at 635.
40. See Paul Marcus, The Reporter's Privilege: An Analysis of the Common Law, Branzburg v.
Hayes, and Recent Statutory Developments, 25 ARIZ. L. REv. 815, 859 (1983). At least twenty-
three states have enacted legislation providing immunity for journalists refusing to divulge
506
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Although the press may enjoy a qualified privilege of confidentiality,
the press does not enjoy constitutional protection from laws of general
application.4 The press is not exempt from obeying federal copyright
laws in publishing copyrighted material.4' The press must obey the
National Labor Relations Act" and the Fair Labor Standards Act.
44
The press may not restrain trade in violation of federal antitrust
laws.45  The press has no greater right than the general public to
acquire information about prison conditions.46 The press is also sub-
ject to nondiscriminatory state tax laws.47
B. Protecting the Press' Right to Publish Truthful Information
Absent a Compelling State Interest: The Daily Mail Cases
Although the press is not immune from laws of general application,
a line of Supreme Court decisions demonstrates the Court's reluctance
to impose penalties on newspapers for violating state statutes when
reported information is lawfully-obtained and truthful.
confidential information before grand juries. See ALA. CODE § 12-21-142 (1986); ARIz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 12.2237 (1982); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (Michie 1987); CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 1070 (West 1966 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 4320 to 4326 (1975); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 110, 8-901 to 8-909 (Smith Hurd 1984 & Supp. 1991); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-3-5-1
(Burns 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 421.100 (Baldwin 1979 & Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 45:1451 to 45:1454 (West 1982); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-112 (1989);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.945(1) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991-1992); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 595.021 to 595.025 (West 1988 & Supp. 1992); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-1-902, 26-1-903
(1988); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-144 to 20-147 (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21 (West
1983); N.M. JUD. RULE 11-514 (Michie 1986); N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (McKinney 1976
& Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (1976); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2739.04,
2739.12 (Anderson 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 1980); ORE. REV. STAT.
§§ 44.510 to 44.540 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 5942 (1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-
208 (1980 & Supp. 1991). Some state courts, however, have argued that shield laws violate
federal and state constitutions. See generally James C. Gooddale, Courts Begin Limiting Scope
of Various State Shield Laws, 1 NAT'L L.J. 28 (1978). Although there is no federal law
equivalent to the state shield laws, Department of Justice regulations recognize a qualified
privilege. See 28 C.F.R. § 50.10 (1991) (establishing requirements for compelling journalists to
testify).
41. See Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937).
42. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
43. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937).
44. Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
45. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
46. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827-28, 830 (1974).
47. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
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L Protecting Accurate Publication of Lawfully-Obtained
Information Absent a Compelling State Interest
Supreme Court decisions suggest that a newspaper has the constitu-
tional right to publish information obtained legally unless the state can
demonstrate a compelling interest in inhibiting publication. For
example, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state may not penalize
newspapers for publishing the name of a rape victim obtained from
public records open to public inspection.48 Also, a state may not
enjoin a newspaper from publishing the name and photograph of the
subject of a juvenile proceeding.49 Additionally, in Smith v. Daily
Mail Publishing Co.,50 the Court ruled that states may not insulate
juvenile criminal proceedings from media coverage.5" The Court
stated that "if a newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information52
about a matter of public significance then state officials may not con-
stitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need to
further a state interest of the highest order."53 The Court found that
protection of juvenile offenders' anonymity is an insufficient state
interest to override a newspaper's First Amendment right to
publication.54
2. Protecting Publication of Truthful Information
Supreme Court decisions also suggest that a newspaper has the right
to publish truthful information. For example, the First Amendment
protects the press against actions by public figures for intentional
infliction of emotional distress unless the statement can be demon-
strated to be false and made with actual malice. 55 The First Amend-
ment also bestows upon the press an absolute privilege to report
48. The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989) (Florida statute making newspaper civilly
liable for publishing rape victim's name held unconstitutional when the information was obtained
from a publicly-released police report); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491
(1975) (civil damage award against a newspaper for broadcasting the name of a rape-murder
victim deemed unconstitutional because the records were accessible to the general public).
49. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977).
50. 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
51. The case involved a West Virginia statute that criminalized the publication of any juvenile
offender's name without the written approval of the juvenile court. Id at 98.
52. The press learned of the shooting through legally monitoring a police radio frequency and
then learned the name of the juvenile suspect from various persons at the scene of the crime. Id.
at 99.
53. Id. at 103.
54. Id. at 104.
55. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). "Actual malice" means knowledge
that the statement was false or made with reckless disregard as to whether it was true. Id.
508
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personal facts about private individuals so long as the facts are true
and accessible to the public.56
III. MEDIA PRESSURES TO BREAK PROMISES OF
CONFIDENTIALITY: MIXED SIGNALS FROM
THE INDUSTRY
Resistance to a general privilege of confidentiality for journalists
exists not only within the courts but also within the media. The press
is the leading advocate of First Amendment rights, yet within the
news industry a journalist's right to protect source confidentiality is
restricted.57 Most news organizations now require reporters to reveal
their sources to their editors.5" Additionally, some news organizations
specify that only the organization-and not the individual reporter-
can promise anonymity.59 Recent political turmoil has also compelled
some journalists to reveal their sources in the interest of fair and thor-
ough reporting." Increasingly, journalists indicate that disclosure of
confidential information about anonymous informants serves the pub-
lic interest.
61
56. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-96 (1975). The Court stated, "We
are reluctant to embark on a course that would make public records generally available to the
media but forbid their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of the supposed reasonable
man." Id. at 496.
57. See Monica Langley & Lee Levine, Broken Promises, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July/
Aug. 1988, at 21. Reporters may reveal their sources only for certain reasons. First, professional
responsibility obligates the press to identify a confidential source when disclosure is necessary to
set the record straight. Id.; see, eg., infra note 60. Second, failure to identify a source may
expose a newspaper to liability in million-dollar libel suits. Langley & Levine, supra, at 21.
Third, unforeseen events may have changed the situation dramatically since the promise of
anonymity was made. Dicke, supra note 32, at 1578. Fourth, information offered by a source
may implicate the source in a criminal investigation. Id. Finally, discovery that a source lied
makes the source's identity and motive newsworthy. Id.
58. Langley & Levine, supra note 57, at 22.
59. Id. Restricting individual journalists' ability to promise anonymity is due in part to Janet
Cooke's admission in 1981 that she fabricated her Pulitzer Prize winning story about "Jimmy,"
an eight-year-old heroin addict. Id.; see also HAROLD L. NELSON et. al., THE LAW OF MAss
COMMUNICATIONS 417 (1989).
60. In 1987, Newsweek revealed that Lt. Colonel Oliver North leaked information concerning
the interception of an Egyptian plane carrying the suspected hijackers of the Achille Lauro.
Newsweek disclosed North's identity as the informant after North, during the Iran-Contra
hearings, claimed that the revelation "very seriously compromised our intelligence activities."
Langley & Levine, supra note 57, at 21. As Harry Johnson, general counsel for Time, Inc.
suggests: "This kind of action is symptomatic of the times, when reporters-and editors
particularly-are less enamored of confidential sources." Id. at 22.
61. See Dicke, supra note 32, at 1566.
509
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IV. THE ROAD NOT TAKEN: DAILY MAIL, NOT
BRANZBURG, SHOULD HAVE CONTROLLED
COHEN
The Supreme Court erred in applying Branzburg rather than Daily
Mail to the facts in Cohen. 62 The Court erred in finding that the First
Amendment was not implicated in promissory estoppel claims for
breach of a promise of confidentiality. The Court also erred in ruling
that civil sanctions did not punish the press. Finally, the Court erred
in finding that promises of confidentiality are legal-rather than
merely ethical-obligations. The Court should have applied the Daily
Mail test to the facts in Cohen.63 The Court should have found that
Minnesota does not have a compelling interest in enforcing the news-
papers' confidentiality promises.
Although the Court in Cohen erred in failing to apply the Daily
Mail test, opportunities exist to minimize the negative impact of
Cohen on freedom of the press. Lower courts should apply Cohen
only when enforcement of the confidentiality promise is necessary to
prevent substantial injustice and when compensatory damages are
equivalent to bonuses newspapers pay to informants. Further, state
legislatures can protect the press from liability for breaking promises
of confidentiality by enacting shield laws.
62. The Daily Mail cases and the Branzburg cases cannot be reconciled with the facts in
Cohen. The Daily Mail cases invalidated statutes inhibiting the ability of the press to print
information contained in records otherwise accessible to the general public. Therefore, the Daily
Mail cases arguably stand for the proposition that the press should be given rights granted to the
public generally. Such an argument appears consistent with the Branzburg cases, which hold the
press to duties imposed upon the public generally. The Daily lail cases would thus be
inapplicable to Cohen because Cohen's identity as the informant was not a matter of public
record. But the Daily Mail cases are not driven by the public records distinction. Instead, the
Daily Mail progeny suggests that absent a compelling state interest, state laws may not punish
the press for publishing information so long as the information was legally-obtained and truthful.
See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text. In both Cohen and the Daily Mail cases, state law
prevented disclosure of information that was neither privileged nor in the public interest to
disclose. If the Cohen Court had believed that the Daily Mail progeny was indistinguishable
from the facts in Cohen, it could have avoided the Daily Mail protection for the press only by
limiting those cases to their facts. However, the Court in Cohen made no effort to limit the Daily
Mail precedents to their facts, believing that Cohen would fail the Daily Mail standard because
the compensatory damages were not technically punishment and the information was not legally
obtained. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2519 (1991). But see supra note 24,
infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
63. That is, the Court should have weighed the state's interest in enforcing confidentiality
promises against the public's interest in obtaining information relevant to a political campaign.
510
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A. Broken Promises of Confidentiality Invoke First Amendment
Protections When the Public Interest in Receiving the
Information Outweighs the State's Interest in
Restricting the Information
The first issue in determining Branzburg's applicability to the facts
in Cohen is whether a promissory estoppel claim for a broken confi-
dentiality promise triggers First Amendment protection. The Court
stated that such a promissory estoppel claim does "not offend the First
Amendment simply because [its] enforcement against the press has
incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."" How-
ever, analyzing laws on the basis of neutral intent is illusory and
should not be dispositive. A neutral law severely inhibiting the press'
ability to publish truthful information strikes stronger at First Amend-
ment protections than a blatantly discriminatory law with only mini-
mal effect on a newspaper's content. 5 The Court should have
examined the effect of the inhibiting law on the press' ability to print
information serving the public's interest.66 The public interest should
be balanced against the state's interest in the inhibiting law.67 Such a
policy balance protects both legitimate state interests and the public's
right to receive important information.68 The publication of Cohen's
name provided important information to Minnesota voters, and any
law inhibiting dissemination of the information implicates the First
Amendment.
Publishing Cohen's name and the information he provided was nec-
essary to fully inform the public of important events in the Minnesota
political process. The information itself necessitated publication
because of Cohen's own efforts in releasing the information to several
64. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., Ill S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991).
65. See id at 2522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (speech addressing public matters rests "on the
highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values ...."); First National Bank v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (speech addressing public or political matters is "at the heart of the
First Amendment's protection." (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940))).
67. The Court has recognized the utility of balancing free speech interests against state
interests. See Tashjian v. Republican Party, 479 U.S. 208, 214 (1986) (courts must weigh injury
to the First Amendment against the state's interest in and necessity of the infringement) (citing
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 757 (1985) (the state's interest must be balanced against First
Amendment interests in protecting expression); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,
496 (1975) (states "must weigh the interests in privacy with the interests of the public to know
and of the press to publish").
68. Dicke, supra note 32, at 1572 ("When new causes of action.., chill the exercise of first
amendment functions, courts must respond with a standard that reconciles the competing
interests.").
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different news media.6 9 It was necessary to publish Cohen's name
because if the paper had simply identified the informant as a person
close to the Whitney campaign, the public would not have fully under-
stood the nature of the relationship between the campaign and
Cohen.7" Publication of Cohen's identity provided important political
information for Minnesota voters because Cohen's partisan past, cou-
pled with his arguable attempt to misinform the public, could be
attributed to the Whitney campaign. 71 The newspaper's prerogative to
publish Cohen's name despite promises of confidentiality was therefore
the sort of right "quintessentially subject to First Amendment
protection.
72
B. Civil Sanctions Punish the Press for Broken Promises of
Confidentiality
The second issue in determining Branzburg's applicability to the
facts in Cohen is whether Minnesota's promissory estoppel doctrine
"punishes" the press when applied to broken promises of confidential-
ity.7" The Cohen majority stated that application of Minnesota's
promissory estoppel doctrine would not punish the newspapers
because the newspapers themselves determined the scope of any legal
obligations and restrictions on publication,7 4 and compensatory dam-
ages in Cohen were constitutionally equivalent to bonuses paid to con-
fidential sources.7" It is well-established, however, that civil sanctions
may have a punitive effect when they are a result of a civil action to
69. Releasing the information to multiple news organizations increased the competitive
pressure to publish the information. Withholding the story was not an option because the
newspapers were compelled to print the story to avoid being accused of a cover-up to protect the
Democratic-Farmer-Laborer campaign, which the Star-Tribune had endorsed a few days prior to
running the story. Respondent Cowles Media Cos. Brief at 12, Cohen (1991 U.S. Briefs LEXIS
No. 90-634).
70. The euphemism "a source close to the Whitney campaign" could be interpreted as merely
a Whitney supporter and not a person occupying a leadership role in the campaign's decisions.
71. De Tocqueville articulated the link between the press and sovereignty: "When the right of
every citizen to a share in the government of society is acknowledged, everyone must be
presumed to be able to choose between ... various opinions .... The sovereignty of the people
and the liberty of the press may therefore be regarded as correlative ...." ALEXANDER DE
TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 1980 (1845), cited in Dicke, supra note 32, at 1559
n.27.
72. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2523 (1991) (Souter, J., dissenting).
73. The Daily Mail cases are not applicable unless state laws punish the press for publishing
legally obtained, truthful information. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518-19; Smith v. Daily Mail
Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
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enforce a law.76 Furthermore, the newspapers in Cohen did not con-
template bonuses in Cohen's case, and there is no indication that the
newspapers had previously made or could have readily afforded such
payments. The Court should have recognized that the potentially
adverse impact on the papers' ability to publish information was
equivalent to punishment.77
C. The Duty of Confidentiality Is an Ethical Rather Than Legal
Obligation
The third issue in determining the applicability of Branzburg to the
facts in Cohen is whether the newspapers legally obtained Cohen's
name.78 The Court stated that the newspapers may not have procured
Cohen's name legally because they "obtained Cohen's name only by
making a promise which they did not honor."7 9 Yet such an argument
begs the question. Because there is no prohibition against making con-
fidentiality promises, the newspapers obtained the information law-
fully; they only may be liable for breaching a promise in publishing the
information. By stating the illegality of the newspaper's action as a
reason to find the newspapers liable, the Court assumes the very con-
clusion it wishes to reach.
In addition, by stating that Cohen's name may not have been legally
obtained, the Court confused an ethical duty with legal liability. Con-
fidentiality promises are widely recognized as an ethical obligation,
regardless of the legal duty accompanying them .8' Accordingly,
76. See, eg., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974) (punishment of error risks
chill on exercise of First Amendment guarantees); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on
Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 386 (1973) (First Amendment does not protect newspaper from
punishment for libel).
77. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. Moreover, the newspapers' reported accurate
political information important to the public. Such information may not be sanctioned.
Garrison v. Indiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) ("Truth may not be the subject of either civil or
criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned.").
78. The Daily Mail requirement of a compelling state interest is inapplicable unless the
information was obtained lawfully by a newspaper. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443
U.S. 97, 103 (1979).
79. Cohen, Ill S. Ct. at 2519.
80. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2513
(1991). The Minnesota Supreme Court stated: "The parties understand that the reporter's
promise of anonymity is given as a moral commitment, but a moral obligation alone will not
support a contract." Id. at 203; see also Cruickshank v. Ellis, 226 N.W. 192, 194 (Minn. 1929).
The American Newspaper Guild's Code of Ethics states, "Newspapermen shall refuse to reveal
confidences or disclose sources of confidential information in court or before judicial or
investigative bodies." See Sanford V. Teplitzky & Kenneth A. Weiss, Newsman's Privilege Two
Years After Branzburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment In Jeopardy, 49 TUL. L. REV. 417, 418
n.7 (1975).
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maintenance of confidentiality promises falls within editorial discre-
tion. Until Cohen, the government could not intrude81 on the editorial
process82 without violating the First Amendment. 3
Decisions about newsgathering techniques and editorial content
should remain with the press. Newspapers' decisions to grant or break
promises of confidentiality are governed by a strict ethical code and
the press' duty to inform the public.84 Promises of confidentiality are
based on the tenets of good journalism.8" Newspapers do not intend to
legally bind themselves to confidentiality promises because certain
conditions may ethically justify the promise's breach.86 Except under
limited circumstances, courts should not interfere with a journalist's
decision concerning confidential sources.
81. Arguably, however, Minnesota's promissory estoppel doctrine does not regulate the
content of a newspaper but merely the extension of false promises. In other words, Cohen might
only stand for the proposition that newspapers may print what they wish, but if they breach
promises of confidentiality in the process, they may not avoid liability by hiding behind the First
Amendment. Yet the assertion that awarding damages will not influence the exercise of First
Amendment rights goes against the weight of authority. Members of the Supreme Court have
recognized that the very possibility of engaging in protracted litigation may impermissibly chill
the exercise of First Amendment rights. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82
(1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Significantly, one newspaper recently prevented distribution of
an entire section after a source claimed that publication of a story contained in the section would
violate her confidentiality agreement with a reporter. Albert Scardino, Newspaper in New Case
Over Naming Source, N.Y. TiMEs, July 24, 1988, § 1, at 14. Because the newspaper's editors
could not verify whether the agreement in fact existed, they decided not to publish the story
rather than risk litigation. Id Though attempting only to compensate Cohen, the Supreme
Court's decision cannot help but affect the content of what the media publishes.
82. The Court has recognized that the "choice of material to go into a newspaper...
constitute[s] the exercise of editorial control and judgment," a process critical to the sound
exercise of First Amendment freedoms. Miami Herald Publishing Cc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241,
258 (1974).
83. The Supreme Court has ruled that "regardless of how benefit-sounding the purposes of
controlling the press might be, we . . . remain intensely skeptical about those measures that
would allow government to insinuate itself into the editorial rooms of this Nation's press."
Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 560-61 (1976) (citing Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at
259).
84. Despite the broken promise of confidentiality in Cohen, the press has a long tradition of
protecting confidential sources. See Marcus, supra note 40, at 817. Journalists have gone to
great lengths to protect confidential sources, including serving lengthy jail terms. See Dicke,
supra note 32, at 1564; In re Farber, 394 A.2d 330 (N.J. 1978) (affirming New York Times
Journalist Myron Farber's conviction for refusing to produce material documents in a murder
trial).
85. Todd F. Simon, Libel as Malpractice: News Media Ethics and the Standard of Care, 53
FORDHAM L. REviEw 449, 473-74 n.121 (1984) (the primary purpose of gathering and
publishing the news is to serve the general welfare by informing the public).
86. See supra note 57.
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D. Reputational and Forum Concerns: In Pursuit of a Compelling
State Interest
Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. involved the publication of truthful
information about a matter of public significance.8 7 Therefore, the
Court should have considered whether the Minnesota promissory
estoppel doctrine-as applied to confidentiality promises by the
press-furthers a compelling state interest.88 The state interest not
only must be sufficiently important in its own right but must also out-
weigh the harms of judicial enforcement of promises between journal-
ists and their sources.89 Cohen may suggest two possible state
interests: First, Minnesota may have an interest in protecting Cohen's
reputation from undue ridicule; second, the state may have an interest
in providing a forum for promissory estoppel actions against newspa-
pers that breach confidentiality promises. Neither interest, however, is
compelling.
L Protecting Cohen's Reputation Is Not a Compelling State Interest
Minnesota may have had an interest in protecting Cohen's reputa-
tion from adverse publicity.90 Such an interest, however, is strikingly
similar to interests in anonymity asserted by criminal suspects and
judges under investigation for alleged misconduct: Disclosure of
names stigmatizes formerly anonymous individuals although they
have not been found guilty of any wrongdoing. The stigma does not
dissipate easily or soon, regardless of whether the alleged wrongdoer is
later cleared. The Supreme Court, however, has found that state inter-
ests in protecting the reputation of criminal suspects or judges under
investigation are not sufficiently compelling to justify restraints on
87. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
89. Broad judicial enforcement of confidentiality promises carries considerable cost to the
public. Such promises, usually oral, are often vague and subject to misunderstanding. Problems
of proof could convert almost every dispute between journalist and source into factual issues for
trial. The cost of litigation and damages could dampen the exercise of First Amendment rights.
See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967) (sanctions against innocent or negligent
misstatement discourages the press from exercising constitutional guarantees). Although
problems of proof are involved in most litigation, such problems are especially troublesome in
litigation involving freedom of the press because "uncertainty gives rise to self-censorship and
inhibits the exercise of First Amendment freedoms." Dicke, supra note 32, at 1570. In the field
of defamation, for example, the cost of defending libel suits has caused some publishers to refuse
to investigate or publish high-risk stories. Id. at 1571, n.103.
90. Cohen claimed that the newspaper articles damaged his reputation and made him so
controversial that his employers had to fire him. Respondent Cowles Media Cos. Brief at 21,
Cohen (1991 U.S. Briefs LEXIS No. 90-634). If his causation argument is correct, then his
damages flow entirely from injury to his reputation.
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reporting truthful information.9 1 Nor are state interests in protecting
individuals from the "mental distress from having been exposed to
public view" sufficient to justify punishment of truthful information. 92
In like manner, Minnesota does not have a compelling state interest in
protecting Cohen's reputation.
Even if Minnesota did have an interest in protecting Cohen's repu-
tation, that interest is not protected by a journalist's privilege of confi-
dentiality. Statutory privileges of confidentiality93 protect the flow of
information, not informants.94 Claims of privilege under the First
Amendment similarly protect the journalist, not the source. 95
Although Cohen may not have sought First Amendment protection
when he requested anonymity, the legal status of confidentiality
promises determines who, if anyone, is wronged when they are
breached. Because Cohen was not protected by the promise, he could
not be injured by its breach.96
2. Protecting a Promissory Estoppel Claimant's Right to a Hearing
Is Not a Compelling State Interest
Minnesota may also have a state interest in providing a forum for
adjudicating an action authorized under state common law. Yet the
application of Minnesota promissory estoppel law to journalistic
91. Butterworth v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1382 (1990) ("[A]bsent exceptional circumstances,
reputational interests alone cannot justify the proscription of truthful speech.").
92. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n.9 (1967).
93. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
94. Confidential sources enjoy common law or statutory protection only in the context of the
limited privileges protecting reporters from compulsory testimony.
[However] the [journalist's] privilege is applied, it appears to protect the communicator, not
the source. Only the reporter may waive the privilege. Minnesota's Cohen case [prior to the
decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court] alone suggests otherwise. Generally, a broken
promise by a reporter raises an ethical question but provides no legal cause of action.
DONALD M. GILMORE et. al., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW: CASE AND COMMENT 394 (5th
ed. 1990); see also New Jersey v. Boiardo, 416 A.2d 793, 798 (N.J. 1980) (privilege of confidenti-
ality belongs only to journalists, not to sources).
95. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 695 (1972) ("The privLege claimed is that of the
reporter, not the informant."); id. at 737-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Mhis protection does not
exist for the purely private interests of the newsman or his informant .... Rather, it functions to
ensure nothing less than democratic decisionmaking through the free flow of information to the
public.").
96. By protecting the listener rather than the speaker in privileged communication, the
journalist's privilege differs from other privileges such as attorney-client, physician-patient,
clergy-penitent, and husband-wife. Accordingly, some jurisdictions have held that journalistic
sources cannot "waive" the privilege and compel unwilling reporters to testify. See United States
v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139, 147 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981). Sources
also cannot invoke a confidentiality privilege to prevent a journalist from testifying if the
journalist so chooses. Small v. United Press International, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS No. 12459 at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (Roberts, Mag.).
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promises of confidentiality may be decided on a constitutional level
without denying sources a forum. If the First Amendment bars
actions against newspapers for breach of confidentiality promises, indi-
viduals may present their cases-to demonstrate that their situations
differ from Cohen's-at motions for summary judgment. The state
need not, and does not, provide full hearings for plaintiffs arguing
claims under well-settled law.
V. CUSHIONING COHEN'S CRASH: JUDICIAL AND
LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
There are two effective methods for limiting the impact of Cohen.
First, lower courts could construe the decision narrowly, limiting it to
its facts. Second, legislatures could pass statutes insulating the press
from liability for breach of confidentiality promises. Either method
would effectively narrow the number of occasions the Cohen decision
is applied.97
A. Cohen's Application Should Be Limited to Situations in Which
Confidentiality Breaches Result in Serious Injustice and in
Which Damages Are Substantially Similar to Bonuses
Courts should limit Cohen's applicability to situations in which a
breach of confidentiality results in serious injustice that can only be
righted by enforcing promises of confidentiality. By suggesting that
the newspapers may have obtained Cohen's name unlawfully,98 the
Court presumably meant that information printed in violation of a
confidentiality agreement is unlawful because it violates state promis-
sory estoppel law. Accordingly, such information is not legally-
obtained and thus not protected by the Daily Mail precedents. But
even if a state court finds that promissory estoppel encompasses confi-
dentiality agreements, it need not find that the information was ille-
gally obtained. Promissory estoppel requires that injustice can only be
righted by enforcing a promise.99 If breach of a confidentiality prom-
97. A third method--beyond the scope of this Note-for limiting the impact of Cohen is for
states to find a protection for the press in their constitutions. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., I11 S.
Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991); Daniel R. Gordon, Progressives Retreat: Falling Back from the Federal
Constitution to State Constitutions, 23 Anxz. ST. L.J. 801, 815-17 (1991) (state constitutions can
be used to limit and distribute power when the Federal Constitution does not); eg., James W.
Talbot, Comment, Rethinking Civil Liberties Under the Washington State Constitution, 66 WASH.
L. REv. 1099, 1100 (1991) (Washington State Constitution provides greater protection for civil
liberties than does the Federal Constitution).
98. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
99. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) ("The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.").
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ise works no injustice, or at least none that can be effectively righted
by enforcing the promise, then the information has been legally-
obtained. In such a case, the Daily Mail precedents would be
controlling.
Courts could also limit Cohen's applicability to situations in which
the damages are substantially similar to bonuses paid by the newspa-
per. The majority in Cohen minimized the constitutional significance
of the burden placed on the newspapers in compensating Cohen by
equating damages with bonuses. "o At issue before the Supreme Court
was $200,000 in compensatory damages. 101 A larger award might,
however, be constitutionally distinguishable from bonuses. Likewise,
a smaller award might still be more constitutionally¢ burdensome than
bonus payments if the newspaper is small or can demonstrate that it
rarely or never gives such bonuses to confidential sources because it
cannot afford them. The Cohen holding should be linited to situations
in which breach of confidentiality has already been held to violate state
promissory estoppel law and in which the damage award would be
substantially similar to bonuses paid by the newspaper.
B. Legislatures Should Statutorily Protect Editorial Decisions to
Breach Promises of Confidentiality
State legislatures should enact shield laws to insulate the press from
liability for breaching promises of confidentiality to informants. A
journalist's privilege of confidentiality need not be protected by the
First Amendment. In the wake of Branzburg v. Hayes, 102 some state
legislatures enacted shield laws protecting the media from forced dis-
closure of confidential sources before grand juries."0 ' As the number
of contempt actions against journalists dwindled in the mid-1980s, it
became apparent that state jurisdictions recognized the legitimacy of a
qualified protection for journalists. 1 4 State shield laws have therefore
been increasingly effective.10 5 Similarly, following the Court's decision
in Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 106 Congress enacted the Privacy
100. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2519.
101. Id. at 2516-17.
102. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
103. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
104. NELSON et. al., supra note 59, at 404-05.
105. See, e.g., Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708 (3d Cir. 197S-) (Third Circuit Court of
Appeals recognized a strong public interest in a Pennsylvania law protecting newspapers from
forced disclosure of sources).
106. 436 U.S. 547 (1978), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 885 (1978) (protection of confidential sources
does not bar warrant-based searches of newspaper offices).
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Protection Act10 7 to protect the press' interests in confidentiality by
limiting police power to search newspaper offices."08 Some states fol-
lowed suit."° Policy interests in protecting the quality of information
available to the public demand that the press should itself determine
whether to honor confidentiality agreements."1 Because the protec-
tion of public interests is within the legislature's realm, state legisla-
tures and Congress should enact laws that protect the press from
liability for broken promises of confidentiality.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Cohen majority incorrectly found that the First Amendment
does not bar actions by plaintiffs seeking damages against newspapers
breaching promises of confidentiality. The Court held that the news-
papers were subject to Minnesota's neutral doctrine of promissory
estoppel without considering whether enforcement of the confidential-
ity promise denied publication of crucial information. The public had
a strong interest in associating Cohen's name with the incomplete
information he leaked to the press because his identity revealed unique
information about the Whitney campaign. The public's interest in
receiving such information should have been balanced against the
state's interest in estopping the press from breaching promises of
confidentiality.
Minnesota's interest in protecting Cohen from breaches of confiden-
tiality promises was minimal. Protecting Cohen's reputation does not
constitute a compelling state interest. Further, providing a forum for
promissory estoppel claimants is not a compelling state interest
because claimants may still demonstrate a unique claim requiring fur-
ther hearing at a motion for summary judgment.
Narrow application of the decision and protective legislation shield-
ing the press from liability may limit the damage suffered by the First
Amendment in the Cohen decision. After all, as Milton argued to Par-
liament in 1644, "Truth and understanding are not such wares as to be
monopolized and traded in by tickets and statutes and standards." 11
Jeffrey A. Richards
107. Pub. L. 96-440, 94 Stat. 1879 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. 2000aa-l 1 (1981)).
108. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000aa-11 (a) (Attorney General must establish guidelines for procuring
material evidence from nonparties which recognize privacy interests).
109. See, eg., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A-84A-21.9 (West Supp. 1991).
110. See supra note 71, 84-86 and accompanying text.
111. JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in THE PORTABLE MILTON 151, 181 (Douglas Bush ed.
1977).
